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Notes 
FROM LANGUAGE TO LAW: INTERPRETATION 




ABSTRACT—This Note surveys evidence concerning how early American 
Supreme Court Justices approached interpretation and construction based on 
an analysis of Supreme Court opinions from 1795 to 1805. An evaluation of 
this evidence indicates two main trends. First, the Justices engaged in 
interpretation and construction as a single process, alternating between 
textual and normative reasoning to determine the intent of the Framers or of 
Congress. In some cases, textual reasoning seemed determinative; in others, 
normative reasoning was decisive. This finding illustrates some tension 
between the idea of limiting judicial discretion in construction and applying 
methods of interpretation and construction that would have been used in the 
Founding Era. This may highlight important questions for some original 
methods originalists. Second, the Justices utilized a variety of tools and 
canons in the construction zone. Acquiescing to historical practice, deferring 
to national interest concerns, and using legislative evidence were all fair 
game. To the extent that modern-day theorists or jurists find Founding-era 
evidence of judicial practice relevant to contemporary debates about 
interpretation and construction, this Note offers evidence of how early 
American Justices went about determining the meaning of legal texts, and 
offers tentative conclusions about the implications for contemporary debates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the law, words matter. And how judges go about deciding what 
words mean matters even more. Look no further than last year’s Supreme 
Court term. The Justices’ analysis of the text of federal and state statutes 
determined whether Ohio was impermissibly restricting its residents’ 
constitutional right to vote.1 The Justices’ analysis of another federal statute 
determined whether the government could deport a lawful permanent 
resident.2 The right to vote, the liberty to remain in the United States––the 
existence and contours of these and other foundational rights and liberties 
come down to written words, whether of state legislation, federal statutes, 
treaties, or the Constitution. Written words have always mattered when 
judges analyze legal texts. And in an age where, according to Supreme Court 
Justice Elena Kagan, “we’re all textualists now,”3 and where two more self-
identified originalist judges have recently joined the Court,4 how we get from 
written words to the law matters more than ever. 
 
 1 See Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1846 (2018) (finding that state statute did 
not violate the requirements of the National Voter Registration Act). 
 2 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1216 (2018) (holding the statute unconstitutionally void 
in violation of due process). 
 3 Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on 
the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg 
[https://perma.cc/N3EV-QB7C]. 
 4 While the originalist pedigree of Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch may be a topic of 
debate, both at least claim the label. See Brent Kendall, Judge Neil Gorsuch Backs Scalia’s “Originalist” 
Approach, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-neil-gorsuch-backs-scalias-
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It may be safe to say that “[e]verybody knows that in legal interpretation 
we start with written words and somehow end up with law,” as Professors 
William Baude and Stephen Sachs assert in a recent article.5 It may even be 
safe to say that everybody agrees—on that, at least. But it is even safer to 
say that not everybody agrees on exactly how we do, or how we should, get 
from written words to resolution of a legal dispute. 
The interpretation-construction distinction offers one theory 
articulating how judges get from written text to the legal resolution of a case.6 
Professor Lawrence Solum, one of the most prolific contemporary scholars 
writing about the interpretation-construction distinction, has described it as 
follows. Analysis starts with the text in dispute: a provision of a statute, a 
phrase in a treaty, or even a single word in the Constitution. “Interpretation” 
applies linguistic rules to uncover the semantic meaning of the text.7 In 
contrast, “construction” applies substantive or legal rules to resolve the 
disputed meaning of the text in question.8 When jurists “interpret,” they find 
out “the meaning of language”; when they “construct,” they find out “its 
legal content—the changes it works in the law by its adoption or 
enactment.”9 Of course, not everybody agrees that Professor Solum’s 
interpretation-construction distinction accurately describes how we get from 
written words to law. Some scholars argue that the interpretation-
construction distinction does not exist.10 Others acknowledge that the 
 
originalist-approach-1485912175 [https://perma.cc/F6C2-GZ7M]; Aziz Huq, Why You Shouldn’t Care 
Whether Kavanaugh Is an ‘Originalist,’ POLITICO (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.politico.com/ 
magazine/story/2018/08/09/kanavaugh-originalist-why-you-shouldnt-care-219344 
[https://perma.cc/4BUP-3ZB3]. 
 5 William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1147 
(2017). 
 6 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 
486–87 (2013) (collecting quotations from judicial opinions to illustrate the distinction between 
interpretation and construction); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 
27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) (explicating the nature of the interpretation-construction distinction). 
 7 See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 6, at 100 (“In general, 
interpretation recognizes or discovers the linguistic meaning of an authoritative legal text.”). 
 8 See id. at 103 (“[C]onstruction gives legal effect to the semantic content of a legal text.”). 
 9 See Baude & Sachs, supra note 5, at 1085–86. 
 10 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 13–14 (2012) (“[T]he noun construction answers both to construe (meaning ‘to interpret’) 
and to construct (meaning ‘to build’)” and “nontextualists have latched onto [this] duality of construction. 
From the germ of an idea in the theoretical works of the 19th-century writer Francis Lieber, scholars have 
elaborated a supposed distinction between interpretation and construction.”) (internal footnote omitted); 
Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 356 (2013) (“The problem with this 
approach is that the new-originalist theory [of the interpretation-construction distinction] is likely doing 
little work in most cases, except taking the judge through a difficult, time-consuming investigation only 
to end up where she started, at step one.”); Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional 
Interpretation/Construction Distinction: A Useful Fiction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 80 (2010) 
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distinction may be useful, but dispute what constitutes “construction” and 
what kinds of canons and evidence are appropriate for use in the 
“construction zone.”11 
While contemporary theories about the interpretation-construction 
distinction have generated robust debate,12 historical evidence prior to the 
mid nineteenth century is less plentiful. Professor Solum notes that “[t]he 
interpretation-construction distinction is an old one, with deep historical 
roots in American jurisprudence.”13 Scholars point to an 1839 treatise by 
Francis Lieber as early evidence recognizing an explicit distinction between 
interpretation and construction as a theoretical matter.14 But what about as a 
practical matter? 
This Note explores what early American judicial practice indicates 
about interpretation, construction, and the interpretation-construction 
distinction based on an analysis of Supreme Court opinions from 1795 to 
1805. In doing so, it canvasses the historical evidence of how early American 
Justices got from written words to law. It summarizes the trends in how early 
American Justices analyzed various texts and offers an assessment of how 
these trends might inform contemporary debates about interpretation and 
construction. 
This Note proceeds on the assumption that evidence of early judicial 
practice has something to tell contemporary jurists about analyzing legal 
text. At minimum, it describes historical practice in the early years of this 
country. At best, it can guide contemporary judges in their analysis of legal 
texts, insofar as original methods originalists and others believe that early 
 
(“Ultimately, debate over the precise contours of constitutional interpretation and constitutional 
construction leaves us with a distinction that is neither obvious nor identifiable through the application of 
an accepted and uniform set of rules. One need only ask . . . theorists . . . to read a Supreme Court opinion 
and they may be hard-pressed to agree as to the point at which the Court stopped interpreting and started 
constructing. Thus, as an aid to the practice of judging, the interpretation/construction distinction is 
largely unhelpful.”). 
 11 See infra Part IV. Solum defines the construction zone as the “zone of underdeterminacy” in which 
construction is required to determine meaning, i.e., where judges are doing work “that goes beyond direct 
translation of semantic content into legal content.” Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 
supra note 6, at 108. 
 12 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Solum, Originalism and Constitutional 
Construction, supra note 6, at 476–90 (discussing objections to the interpretation-construction distinction 
on terminological and substantive grounds). 
 13 See Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 492. 
 14 See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 6, at 110 (citing FRANCIS 
LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS 55–82 (Enlarged ed., Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 
Wm. S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1970) (1839)); see also Ralf Poscher, The Hermeneutic Character of Legal 
Construction, in LAW’S HERMENEUTICS: OTHER INVESTIGATIONS 207 (Simone Glanert & Fabien Girard 
eds., 2017) (discussing the history of the distinction between legal interpretation and construction). 
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judicial practice can and should do so. Even for those who believe Founding-
era judicial practice should not guide, much less dictate, contemporary 
jurisprudence, a description of historical methods provides material for 
articulating arguments about how judges should proceed today. It is only by 
describing and understanding historical practice that we can make arguments 
about either its instructive value or its inadequacy as a guide to contemporary 
debates. With that historical evidence in hand, theorists and judges can more 
fulsomely engage in the debate about how we do and how we should get 
from written words to law. 
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I places this evaluation in the 
context of scholarly debates about the interpretation-construction distinction. 
Part II begins by outlining the methodology used to select and analyze cases, 
including how evidence was characterized as “interpretation” as opposed to 
“construction.” It then analyzes the Justices’ opinions in one case, Calder v. 
Bull, to illustrate this methodology. Parts III and IV trace the trends in how 
early American Supreme Court Justices approached getting from written 
words to the legal resolution of the cases before them. Each Part presents the 
trend through illustrative case descriptions, offers an analysis of the 
implications for the interpretation-construction distinction, and argues how 
this evidence might inform contemporary judicial practice. 
Part III of this Note describes how early American judicial practice does 
not neatly align with the interpretation-construction distinction as a matter 
of practice. Rather than engaging in a consistent two-step sequential process 
with discrete modes of analysis, early American Justices alternated between 
considering linguistic meaning and substantive norms to render the text 
determinate by giving effect to the drafters’ purpose, engaging in both 
interpretation and construction in a unified process. This finding illustrates 
some tension between the idea of limiting judicial discretion in construction 
and applying methods of interpretation and construction that would have 
been used in the Founding Era. Such tension may highlight important 
questions for original methods originalists. 
Part IV of this Note illustrates how Justices relied on a variety of tools 
(linguistic and normative canons) in the construction zone to derive legal 
meaning from the text they considered––a broader array than at least some 
originalists, including some original methods originalists, would condone.15 
This Note concludes by considering how this historical evidence can inform 
contemporary debates about how we do and should get from language to law. 
 
 15 See infra Part IV. 
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I. THE INTERPRETATION-CONSTRUCTION DEBATE 
The interpretation-construction distinction dates back at least as far as 
1839 to a treatise by Francis Lieber.16 A number of distinguished authorities 
have discussed the distinction since then, most notably in the context of 
interpreting contracts,17 and the interpretation-construction distinction has 
generated robust debate among academics and legal theorists. Some 
originalist theorists have discussed interpretation and construction as 
separate “stages” in determining the meaning of constitutional provisions.18 
Other scholars have applied this interpretation-construction distinction to 
analyses of statutes, contracts, and other legal texts.19 Still other scholars 
dispute the distinction’s relevance and even its existence.20 Professors John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, for example, argue that interpretation and 
construction are essentially a single activity.21 Beyond the realm of scholarly 
debate, jurists have also referenced the distinction in a number of federal and 
state court cases.22 
So what is the interpretation-construction distinction these scholars and 
jurists are debating? Professor Solum, the most prolific scholar to explore 
 
 16 LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 14, at 56 (defining “construction” as 
“the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects, that lie beyond the direct expression of the text, from 
elements known from and given in the text—conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the 
letter of the text”); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 479, 483 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Communicative Content] (discussing Lieber’s treatise 
as some of the earliest evidence of the interpretation-construction distinction). 
 17 See Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 16, at 483 n.11 (listing several contracts treatises). 
 18 See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 6, at 95; see also Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551 (2010) (discussing the various stages of 
interpretation); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 69 
(2011) (“[O]riginalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that identifies the meaning of the text 
as its public meaning at the time of its enactment.”); Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American 
Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119 (2010) (discussing relationship between constitutional 
interpretation and construction). See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–7 (1999); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
1–19 (1999). 
 19 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967) 
(discussing interpretation and construction in the context of contracts). 
 20 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 
16, at 502–15 (discussing arguments of other scholars that the constitutional construction zone does not 
exist). 
 21 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New 
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 753 (2009) 
(“Moreover, a dichotomy between interpretation and construction that allows extraconstitutional norms 
undermines the stability of original meaning, because the Constitution would not govern many 
‘constitutional’ issues.”). 
 22 See Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 16, at 483 n.10 (listing cases referencing the 
interpretation-construction distinction). 
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the distinction, describes the distinction in terms of the difference between 
communicative content and legal content. He defines communicative 
content, the result of interpretation, as the “linguistic meaning” of a legal 
text,23 while legal content, the result of construction, is “the content of the 
legal norms the text produces.”24 Legal content includes “rules, standards, 
principles, obligations, [and] mandates.”25 Where the meaning of a word or 
phrase renders a provision ambiguous (i.e., susceptible of multiple 
meanings), the activity of interpretation recovers the linguistic or semantic 
meaning of the text.26 Interpretation analyzes linguistic facts: common usage, 
linguistic practice, and regular syntax and grammar rules.27 But where a word 
or phrase renders the provision vague (i.e., having indefinite meaning) or 
irreducibly ambiguous, construction translates linguistic meaning into legal 
effect.28 Construction considers legal norms and political morality and 
determines the legal content of the text.29 
Professor Solum has clarified that while his theoretical model for 
interpretation and construction illustrates a sequential process, “real judges 
might begin with construction, move back to interpretation, and then revise 
the construction—or do both more or less simultaneously.”30 He argues that 
judges can proceed to constitutional construction even if the Constitution’s 
original linguistic meaning determines the case, and not only when the 
Constitution’s original meaning underdetermines the case.31 But calling it the 
interpretation-construction distinction relies on the idea that there are two 
separate activities, even if they form a single process. The distinction does 
not require that these separate activities be sequential. But for the 
interpretation-construction distinction to do any work in limiting how judges 
analyze text, construction would have to be confined to underdeterminate 
cases—where interpretation and tools to discover semantic meaning alone 
 
 23 Professor Solum has called communicative content “semantic” or “linguistic” content. See Solum, 
Communicative Content, supra note 16, at 480 (“The phrase ‘communicative content’ is simply a precise 
way of labeling what we usually call the ‘meaning’ or ‘linguistic meaning’ of the text.”); Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 464 (“This aspect of meaning is sometimes 
called ‘literal meaning’—the meaning that we get from the words alone (without reference to context). 
Using a slightly different vocabulary, we can call this aspect of meaning ‘semantic content.’”). 
 24 See Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 16, at 480. 
 25 Id. at 507. 
 26 See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 6, at 96–102. 
 27 Id. at 99, 104. 
 28 Id. at 103. 
 29 Id. at 100 n.13, 104. 
 30 Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 495. 
 31 See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 6, at 103–08 (asserting that 
construction includes the determination of legal effect of both indeterminate and determinate 
constitutional meaning). 
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were insufficient to resolve the case. As discussed later in Part III, the 
historical evidence indicates that early American judicial practice more 
closely tracks Professor Solum’s clarified approach. 
Scholarly debate engages with a variety of questions regarding the 
interpretation-construction distinction. One area of debate queries which 
actors have the authority or legitimacy to properly engage in interpretation 
or construction.32 This Note takes no position on whether certain actors more 
legitimately engage in interpretation or construction than others. Instead, it 
focuses on how early American Supreme Court Justices approached the 
project of determining meaning. In a recent essay, Professor Lee Strang 
examined evidence of how participants in the First Congress’s debates about 
the Bank of the United States approached the construction of constitutional 
text.33 In contrast, this Note focuses on different actors—Supreme Court 
Justices—from roughly the same historical period, offering a potentially 
complementary evaluation of historical evidence of the judiciary’s approach. 
This Note also examines a wider array of material than Professor Strang’s 
essay; rather than focusing only on cases dealing with constitutional 
provisions, this Note evaluates evidence of how Justices approached 
statutory and treaty interpretation and construction as well. This relates to 
another area of debate regarding parallelism:34 whether the interpretation-
construction distinction applies the same way to determining the meaning of 
statutes as well as of the Constitution. This Note considers how the Justices 
approached multiple kinds of legal texts. While this Note may provide 
evidence to inform further research questions, it leaves a more detailed 
analysis of parallelism in early American judicial practice to future research. 
This Note focuses instead on two other questions in the debate 
surrounding the existence and definition of the interpretation-construction 
distinction. First, in practice, did early American jurists engage in 
interpretation and construction as separate, sequential activities or as part of 
a unified larger process? In either case, did they engage in construction––
 
 32 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possibilities and 
Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 272–74 (2011) (describing the different stances of 
a number of scholars with regards to the actors who appropriately engage in construction); see also Lee 
J. Strang, An Evaluation of Historical Evidence for Constitutional Construction from the First Congress’ 
Debate over the Constitutionality of the First Bank of the United States, 14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 193, 196 
n.26 (2018) [hereinafter Strang, An Evaluation of Historical Evidence] (contrasting originalist stances on 
whether construction is a political task appropriately to the political branches, or whether judges properly 
engage in construction); Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 6, at 103 
(distinguishing “judicial construction from political construction and private construction” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 33 Strang, An Evaluation of Historical Evidence, supra note 32, at 194. 
 34 Parallelism here refers to the idea that approaches to determining the meaning of statutes do or 
should mirror approaches to determining the meaning of the Constitution. 
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giving legal effect––only where interpretation failed to render text 
sufficiently determinate? Or did early American jurists engage in 
construction even where interpretation sufficiently determined the text to 
resolve the case?35 This Note evaluates evidence of how the Founding-era 
Justices engaged in the process of determining meaning and finds evidence 
indicating that early American Supreme Court Justices considered these 
activities as simultaneous parts of a larger process.36 The evidence further 
indicates that Justices engaged in “construction” even in cases where 
“interpretation” rendered meaning determinate, not only in cases where the 
meaning was underdeterminate.37 
Second, which tools, evidence, or rules are acceptable for use within 
the construction zone to determine meaning?38 This Note presents initial 
findings regarding the tools and evidence that early American Supreme 
Court Justices relied upon to determine meaning. It also offers tentative 
conclusions about the implications of those findings for the interpretation-
construction distinction and contemporary jurisprudence. 
II. ANALYZING THE CASES 
But how to go about answering these questions? Focusing on early 
American judicial practice means that looking at cases seems a good place 
to start. But which ones? And how can we analyze the Justices’ approach to 
getting from words to law? This Part discusses the selection of and analytical 
approach to the cases. It also illustrates the approach by walking through the 
analysis of the Justices’ opinions in a particular case, Calder v. Bull.39 
The pool of cases includes Supreme Court opinions from 1795 to 180540 
that reference the terms “interpret,” “interpretation,” “construe,” or 
 
 35 See Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 16, at 511–18 (describing the different views of 
originalists and living constitutionalists regarding the scope of construction); see also Strang, An 
Evaluation of Historical Evidence, supra note 32, at 196–97 (noting the difference in opinion among 
originalists regarding whether constitutional construction occurs only in cases of underdeterminacy or 
whether it also occurs where interpretation yields a determinate result). 
 36 For more on the scholarly debate on this question, see infra Section III.A. 
 37 See infra Section III.B. 
 38 See infra Part IV. 
 39 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
 40 The pool comprised thirty-three cases. This time frame captures cases in the early days of the 
independent United States to illustrate judicial practice following the Founding. It is designed to be broad-
ranging substantively, which requires a narrow time period in order to provide a manageable number of 
cases for analysis. Substantively, this analysis considers cases where the Justices analyzed constitutional, 
federal statutory, and treaty provisions. It spans the transition between the period when the Justices issued 
seriatim opinions and when they transitioned to issuing majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. It 
also spans the pre-Marshall Court and the early days of the Marshall Court. Further research can expand 
upon these initial findings to look for further trends—for example, whether the practice of the Marshall 
Court differed significantly from previous courts. 
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“construction,” as identified by a keyword search of these terms.41 Cases 
containing these keywords are likely the most relevant cases for analysis 
because where the Justice explicitly described his analysis as either 
“interpreting” or “constructing,” he consciously referenced his method. 
Where the Justice was thus explicitly conscious of his method, it is more 
likely that the opinion will demonstrate how the Justice approached 
analyzing the text to determine its meaning. 
However, the keyword search may not capture the entire universe of 
relevant cases. As Professor Solum notes, construction will be most apparent 
where the judge is in the “construction zone”: where the text is indeterminate 
or underdeterminate and yields no clear semantic meaning.42 In some cases, 
the semantic meaning may correspond directly to giving legal effect: where 
the language is neither vague nor ambiguous, the semantic meaning 
straightforwardly resolves the case. These cases may be omitted from an 
analysis of opinions where the Justice self-consciously engaged in an 
interpretive project. Additionally, such cases may also fail to reach the 
Supreme Court at all if they present little interpretive controversy. 
Ultimately, this sample is not intended to be exhaustive; rather, it facilitates 
examination of the kind of evidence early American judicial practice 
provides regarding interpretation, construction, and the interpretation-
construction distinction. 
An important note: the characterization in this Note of the Justices as 
“interpreting” or “constructing” did not rely on the Justices’ use of either 
word—i.e., if the Justice used the word “interpret,” this did not necessarily 
mean he was “interpreting” in Professor Solum’s terms.43 Similarly, if the 
Justice used the word “construct,” this did not necessarily mean he was 
“constructing” in Professor Solum’s terms. This is critical because several 
trends in these early cases indicate that the Justices did not consistently use 
the word “interpretation” to refer to semantic meaning and “construction” to 
 
 41 A keyword search in LexisNexis was crosschecked with Westlaw to ensure consistency. This Note 
compares majority, concurring, dissenting, and seriatim opinions within each case and specifically 
references the Justice who authored the opinion. See infra note 62 for a brief background on seriatim 
opinions. 
 42 For more on the “construction zone,” see Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 
supra note 6, at 108; see also supra text accompanying note 11. 
 43 See Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 496 (noting that 
“[c]onstitutional actors who are unfamiliar with the vocabulary and substance of the interpretation-
construction distinction cannot be expected to engage in reliable reporting of their own deliberative 
processes in the technical vocabulary” used in contemporary theoretical debates). This Note does not rely 
upon the Justices to “engage in reliable reporting” of whether they are engaging in interpretation or 
construction, as Professor Solum would understand those terms. 
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refer to legal effect.44 First, the frequency of usage indicates that the Justices 
generally relied on the term “construction” to refer to the process that 
included both discovering meaning and determining legal effect. Of the 
thirty-three cases in the final sample, twenty-five referred only to 
construction,45 only six referenced both interpretation and construction,46 and 
none used only “interpretation” or “interpret.” Within those cases, the 
Justices overwhelmingly referenced “construction” or “construe,”47 and only 
sparingly referenced “interpret” or “interpretation.”48 Second, the manner in 
which the Justices used “construction” indicates that they used it to describe 
any activity that went beyond plain meaning.49 This included where the 
 
 44 See Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 16, at 483 (noting that “[n]othing hangs on the 
terminology,” and asserting that the words “interpretation” and “construction” can apply distinctly to the 
activities of discovering meaning and determining legal effect or, alternatively, to a process that includes 
both activities); see also Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 475 (“The 
use of the terms ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction’ to mark the distinction between meaning and effect is 
not itself important. We could use a different vocabulary. For example, we might say ‘linguistic 
interpretation’ and ‘constructive interpretation.’ Or we might differentiate ‘finding meaning’ from 
‘determining legal effect.’ Whatever vocabulary we use, we are marking a theoretical distinction that is 
not fully reflected in common usage.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 10, at 15 (noting that the terms 
“interpretation” and “construction” have never reflected courts’ actual usage). This evidence appears to 
support Scalia and Garner’s position insofar as early American judicial practice does not reflect usage of 
the terms as Professor Solum would understand them. 
 45 See, e.g., Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804); Faw v. Marsteller, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 
10 (1804); Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804); Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33 (1804); 
Hodgson v. Dexter, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 345 (1803); Hooe v. Groverman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 214 (1803); 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); United States v. Hooe, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 318 (1803); 
United States v. Simms, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 252 (1803); Wood v. Owings, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 239 (1803);  
Turner v. Fendall, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 117 (1801); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 
(1801); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12 (1800); Priestman v. United States, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 
28 (1800); Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411 (1799); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); 
Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365 (1797); Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344 (1797); Huger v. 
South Carolina, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 339 (1797); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); Wiscart 
v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795). 
 46 See, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803); Wilson v. Mason, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 45 
(1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); Sims v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425 (1799); Wilson v. 
Daniel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 401 (1798); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
 47 The cases included 139 instances where the Justices used “construction” and twenty-three where 
they used “construe.” 
 48 Thirteen instances, to be exact. 
 49 See, e.g., Pennington, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 51 (“The solution of this question depends on the 
construction of the act by which the duty was imposed.”); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 393 (opinion of 
Chase, J.) (“If the term ex post facto law is to be construed to include and to prohibit the enacting any 
law after a fact, it will greatly restrict the power of the federal and state legislatures; and the consequences 
of such a construction may not be foreseen.” (emphasis omitted)); Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 233 (opinion 
of Chase, J.) (“[I]f the words in the enacting clause, in their nature, import, and common understanding, 
are not ambiguous, but plain and clear, and their operation and effect certain, there is no room for 
construction.” (emphasis omitted)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
160 
Justices relied on grammatical canons,50 which Professor Solum would call 
“interpretation.” Furthermore, where the Justices used both the term 
“interpretation” and “construction,” they appeared to use them 
interchangeably.51 For example, the Justices’ use of the phrase 
“misconstruction” also indicated “construction” was used in place of 
“interpretation.”52 The way the Justices used construction to refer to both 
linguistic meaning and legal effect may indicate that they approached getting 
from written words to law as a single process that included both discovering 
meaning and determining legal content. Part III considers this implication in 
more detail. 
Instead of relying on the words, the characterization of the Justices’ 
analysis as “interpreting” or “constructing” depended on the underlying 
analysis, including the canons and other evidence the Justices used.53 
Sections of opinions classified as the Justices determining semantic 
content—Professor Solum’s “interpretation”—included sections where the 
Justice focused on the literal meaning of words, referenced ordinary meaning 
as opposed to legal terms of art, or relied on classic linguistic canons of 
 
 50 See, e.g., Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 109 (“On any other construction the word 
definitive would be rendered useless and inoperative.” (emphasis omitted)); Priestman, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 
at 34 (“But it is too plain for argument, that this section cannot, by any fair and rational construction, be 
made to refer to the 19th section. It is inapplicable, because the objects are entirely different.”); Ware, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 284 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (“The 5th article, it is conceived, can not affect or alter 
the construction of the 4th article. For, first, it is against reason, that a special provision made respecting 
debts by name, should be taken away immediately after, in the next article, by general words, or words 
of implication, which words too, have, otherwise, ample matter to operate upon. 2d. No implication from 
the 5th article, can touch the present case, because that speaks only of actual confiscations, and here was 
no confiscation.”). 
 51 See, e.g., Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 299 (“[I]t is sufficient to observe, that practice and 
acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial 
system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary 
interpretation of the most forcible nature.”); Daniel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 405 (“The construction, which is 
thus given, not only comports with every word in the law, but enables us to avoid an inconvenience, 
which would otherwise affect the impartial administration of justice . . . . It is not to be presumed that the 
Legislature intended to give any party such an advantage over his antagonist; and it ought to be avoided, 
as it may be avoided, by the fair and reasonable interpretation, which has been pronounced.”); Ware, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 240 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“When we collect the intention from the words only, as 
they lie in the writing before us, it is a literal interpretation; and indeed if the words, and the construction 
of a writing, are clear and precise, we can scarce call it interpretation to collect the intention of the writer 
from thence. The principal rule to be observed in literal interpretation, is to follow that sense, in respect 
both of the words, and the construction, which is agreeable to common use.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 52 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178 (1804) (“Is the officer who obeys them 
liable for damages sustained by this misconstruction of the act, or will his orders excuse him?”); Ware, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 271 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“In proceeding to examine the treaty with these sentiments, 
it may well be imagined I do it with a reverential and sacred awe, left by any misconstruction of mine, I 
should weaken any one of its provisions.”). 
 53 See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation.54 Sections of opinions classified as the Justices “giving legal 
effect”—Professor Solum’s “construction”—included where the Justice 
relied on substantive canons of construction, consequentialist reasoning, or 
other legal norms to determine meaning.55 These legal norms included 
national security interests, retroactivity, and historical context.56 For 
example, Justices engaged in “interpretation” when they looked at the whole 
act to contextually determine the appropriate meaning of the word based on 
its use in other provisions of the same or related statutes.57 In contrast, the 
Justices engaged in “construction” when they relied on normative reasoning 
based on the content of the statute to determine whether a given meaning 
was “just.”58 
 
 54 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral 
Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005) (“Language canons consist of predictive guidelines as to what 
the legislature likely meant based on its choice of certain words rather than others, or its grammatical 
configuration of those words in a given sentence, or the relationship between those words and text found 
in other parts of the same statute or in similar statutes. These canons do not purport to convey a judge’s 
own policy preferences, but rather to give effect to ‘ordinary’ or ‘common’ meaning of the language 
enacted by the legislature.”) (footnote omitted). Professor Solum notes that such “language canons” are 
canons of interpretation, as opposed to construction. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional 
Construction, supra note 6, at 507 n.177. 
 55 See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 109–
10 (2010) (“Federal courts have long employed substantive canons of construction to interpret federal 
statutes. Some substantive canons express a rule of thumb for choosing between equally plausible 
interpretations of ambiguous text. The rule of lenity is often described this way: it directs that courts 
interpret ambiguous penal statutes in favor of the defendant. Other canons are more aggressive, permitting 
a court to forgo a statute’s most natural interpretation in favor of a less plausible one more protective of 
a particular value. For example, a court will strain the text of a statute to avoid deciding a serious 
constitutional question, and absent a clear statement, it will not interpret an otherwise unqualified statute 
to subject either the federal government or the states to suit. While courts and commentators sometimes 
seek to rationalize these and other substantive canons as proxies for congressional intent, it is generally 
recognized that substantive canons advance policies independent of those expressed in the statute.”). 
Professor Solum notes that such substantive canons seek legal effect, not meaning. Solum, Originalism 
and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 507 n.178. 
 56 This Note discusses these particular norms because they were present in the cases in the sample. 
 57 This approach applies Professor Solum’s characterization of interpretation as including where 
jurists rely on linguistic canons. See Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, 
at 507 n.177. 
 58 See id. at 510 (“Moreover, to the extent that these methods resolve irreducible ambiguity or 
vagueness by considering factors like ‘conducive to the public good,’ ‘public convenience,’ ‘general 
intent,’ ‘equality,’ ‘injustice,’ ‘inconvenience,’ and ‘equity of the case,’ the original methods will yield 
constructions and not interpretations.”). 
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In thirteen cases in the sample the Justices primarily interpreted federal 
statutes;59 in eight cases they addressed state laws.60 The Justices analyzed 
constitutional provisions in several cases in the sample.61 This may represent 
a small sample from which to draw generalizations about how the Justices 
ascertained the meaning of constitutional, as opposed to statutory, text. 
While few in number, these cases nonetheless offer a variety of opinions to 
compare and contrast judicial approaches and from which to observe trends 
and outline further questions. 
To illustrate the analytical approach, take the Justices’ seriatim62 
opinions in Calder v. Bull. In Calder, Justices Chase, Patterson, and Iredell 
 
 59 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (interpreting a nonintercourse law with 
France); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (same); Pennington v. Coxe, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33 (1804) (interpreting an act repealing a duty on sugar refiners); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 299 (1803) (interpreting Congress’s power to constitute “inferior tribunals” to determine the 
constitutionality of a federal statute reconfiguring circuit courts); United States v. Hooe, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
318 (1803) (interpreting the repeal reinstating a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 requiring that a 
statement of facts must accompany the transcript in chancery cases); United States v. Simms, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 252 (1803) (interpreting acts creating the District of Columbia and providing for its 
governance); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801) (interpreting acts on salvage rates for 
recaptured ships); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800) (same); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. 
(4 Dall.) 12 (1800) (finding that under the Judiciary Act the court could hear a case involving a foreign 
citizen that regarded real property in the United States); Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411 (1799) 
(finding the court did not have original jurisdiction where states were not actual parties to suit about 
disputed land); Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 401 (1798) (finding that under the Judiciary Act the 
amount in controversy for subject matter jurisdiction depended on the original amount in dispute when 
the action was instituted); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796) (finding that deference owed 
to findings of fact appealed to the Court on causes of equity or admiral jurisdiction whether they had only 
the statement of facts or also included the evidence); Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 
(1795) (interpreting an act establishing court of admiralty). 
 60 See Faw v. Marsteller, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 10 (1804) (interpreting a Virginia act for adjusting and 
settling contracts made after paper money had been taken out of circulation); Wood v. Owings, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 239 (1803) (interpreting a Maryland statute regarding deeds in light of a federal uniform 
bankruptcy statute); Turner v. Fendall, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 117 (1801) (interpreting a Virginia act providing 
terms to recover from sheriff executing a writ); Wilson v. Mason, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 45 (1801) 
(interpreting jurisdiction in a Virginia state law regarding property causes of action); Sims v. Irvine, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425 (1799) (interpreting Virginia laws addressing land grants and title to property); 
Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365 (1797) (interpreting Virginia laws providing for settling debts after 
paper money was taken out of circulation); Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344 (1797) (interpreting 
Rhode Island courts’ rules of decision in trials at common law against a federal judicial statute); Ware v. 
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (interpreting a Virginia state law confiscating British property in light 
of the peace treaty with Great Britain). 
 61 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (interpreting “appellate jurisdiction” of the 
Supreme Court to determine its authority to directly issue a writ of mandamus); Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
299; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (interpreting the “ex post facto” clause in light of a 
Connecticut statute providing for probate decision appeals); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 
(1796) (interpreting “duties” in the Taxing Clause as applied to a federal statute taxing carriages). 
 62 Prior to the Marshall Court (1801–1835), U.S. Supreme Court Justices delivered judicial opinions 
seriatim, that is, each judge wrote his own opinion, rather than a single judge writing the opinion on behalf 
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ascertained the meaning of “ex post facto” law to determine whether a 
Connecticut law unconstitutionally granted parties a new hearing after a 
probate court declared a will invalid.63 Justice Chase alternated between 
interpreting and constructing. He opened his opinion with a broad appeal to 
the principles of republican government,64 before focusing on the Framers’ 
purpose in prohibiting ex post facto laws.65 He referenced the text of the 
constitutional provision, citing the language “that no state shall pass any ex 
post facto law,”66 and then set off to define an “ex post facto” law “within 
the words and meaning” of the Constitution.67 He noted that, “naked and 
without explanation,” the prohibition “is unintelligible, and means 
nothing.”68 Justice Chase looked at the “plain and obvious meaning and 
intention of the prohibition,”69 then noted that the Framers did not intend 
such laws to protect private rights.70 He engaged in interpretation when he 
implicitly invoked the canon against surplusage: ex post facto could not 
mean simply “retroactive,” otherwise the other prohibitions in the clause 
would be rendered superfluous.71 Justice Chase noted that “ex post facto” 
laws have a technical meaning as legal terms of art,72 and that Blackstone 
agreed with that definition, again interpreting.73 He referenced the usage of 
“ex post facto” laws in state constitutions to refer to retroactivity.74 He 
distinguished this by stating that where “ex post facto” was used in a context 
unrelated to legislative acts, it meant retroactive; however, in reference to 
legislative acts, it applied only to retroactive criminal laws.75 He then 
engaged in construction when he found support for this in the Framers’ 
 
of the entire court. Seriatim opinions provide particularly useful material to directly contrast the approach 
of multiple justices to the same question of interpretation or construction. 
 63 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 387. 
 64 Id. at 388–89 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“To maintain that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses 
such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, 
altogether inadmissible in our free republican governments.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 65 Id. at 389. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 390. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 The other items in the clause prohibit making anything but gold or silver coin a tender in payment 
of debts and passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Id. 
 72 Id. at 391 (“The expressions ‘ex post facto laws,’ are technical,” and “had been in use long before 
the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by Legislators, Lawyers, and Authors.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 391−92. 
 75 Id. at 393. 
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purpose to constrict unjust legislative acts76 and in applying separation of 
powers and federalism canons.77 Justice Chase then pivoted back to 
interpretation when he further noted that “ex post facto” laws in the 
Constitution meant only criminal laws, because if they included civil 
retroactivity, the Takings Clause would be rendered surplus.78 Throughout 
the opinion, Justice Chase alternated between considering text and 
substantive norms, between interpreting and constructing, and then found in 
this case that text ultimately controlled.79 
In his opinion, Justice Paterson predominantly engaged in what 
Professor Solum would call interpretation as opposed to construction. He 
started with the technical and legal meaning of “ex post facto law” as a term 
of art, engaging in interpretation.80 He then referenced history to support why 
ex post facto laws were prohibited.81 Similarly to Justice Chase, Justice 
Paterson looked to usage in state constitutions and noted that if “ex post 
facto” meant “retroactive,” it would render the subsequent term in the 
constitutional clause—that states cannot pass laws impairing the obligation 
of contracts—superfluous, again interpreting.82 Continuing to interpret, 
Justice Paterson emphasized how the Framers would have understood the 
words,83 and relied on the linguistic structure of the clause to indicate 
meaning.84 He concluded that the phrase “ex post facto” must be considered 
in its technical legal sense to refer only to crimes, rather than in its “literal” 
meaning.85 
 
 76 Id. at 394. 
 77 Id. at 393 (“If the term ex post facto law is to be construed to include and to prohibit the enacting 
any law after a fact, it will greatly restrict the power of the federal and state legislatures; and the 
consequences of such a construction may not be foreseen.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 78 Id. at 394. 
 79 Id. at 392 (“[It] is not within the letter of the prohibition; and, for the reasons assigned, I am clearly 
of opinion, that it is not within the intention of the prohibition; and if within the intention, but out of the 
letter, I should not, therefore, consider myself justified to continue it within the prohibition.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 80 Id. at 396 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 81 Id. (“The historic page abundantly evinces, that the power of passing such laws should be withheld 
from legislators; as it is a dangerous instrument in the hands of bold, unprincipled, aspiring, and party 
men, and has been t[o]o often used to effect the most detestable purposes.”). 
 82 Id. at 397 (“Again, the words of the Constitution of the United States are, ‘That no State shall pass 
any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.’ Article 1st section 
10. Where is the necessity or use of the latter words, if a law impairing the obligation of contracts, be 
comprehended within the terms ex post facto law?”). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
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Justice Iredell, too, stuck to interpretation. Justice Iredell started his 
opinion with the purpose of the Framers and reasoned back from intent.86 He 
looked at the danger the Framers sought to guard against87 and determined 
that the “policy, the reason and humanity, of the prohibition, do not . . . 
extend to civil cases.”88 He then appealed to pragmatic considerations of 
government function89 to conclude that “ex post facto” only concerned 
criminal laws. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Walking through the Justices’ opinions in Calder v. Bull illustrates how 
the analysis examined judicial language and characterized where the Justice 
was engaged in either “interpretation” or “construction.” Applying this 
analysis to all the cases in the sample offers a modest examination of 
evidence of how early American Justices approached interpretation, 
construction, and the interpretation-construction distinction. But what does 
that evidence show? The next Part provides some answers. 
III. EARLY AMERICAN JUDICIAL PRACTICE: CONSISTENTLY INCONSISTENT 
This Part discusses the cases and the first trend in the Justices’ approach 
to getting from written words to the legal resolution of the cases before them. 
Did the way the Justices analyzed the text indicate that they considered 
discovering meaning and determining legal content to be distinct activities? 
And did the way the Justices analyzed the text indicate that construction was 
appropriate only in cases where the text was underdeterminate, or also when 
the text was determinate? This Part describes how the Justices engaged in 
interpretation and construction as both simultaneous and sequential 
processes of analysis. It first describes the trend through illustrative cases 
and then offers tentative conclusions about the implications for the 
contemporary debate about interpretation and construction and original 
methods originalism. Most notably, this trend indicates a tension between 
the idea that judicial discretion in construction should be limited, and the 
idea that modern-day judges should approach interpretation and 
 
 86 Id. at 399–400 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 87 Id. (“The history of every country in Europe will furnish flagrant instances of tyranny exercised 
under the pretext of penal dispensations . . . . [T]he framers of the American Constitutions have wisely 
denied to the respective Legislatures, Federal as well as State, the possession of the power [of passing ex 
post facto laws] itself.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 88 Id. at 400. 
 89 Id. (“Without the possession of this power the operations of Government would often be 
obstructed, and society itself would be endangered.”). 
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construction, of the Constitution at least, by applying methods of 
interpretation and construction that would have been used in the Founding 
Era.90 Can original methods originalists reconcile these two imperatives, and 
if so, how? 
Professor Solum has clarified that while his theoretical model for 
interpretation and construction illustrates a sequential process, “real judges 
might begin with construction, move back to interpretation, and then revise 
the construction—or do both more or less simultaneously.”91 Yet calling it 
the interpretation-construction distinction relies on the idea that there are two 
separate activities, even if they form a single process. The distinction does 
not require that these separate activities be sequential. But for the 
interpretation-construction distinction to do any work in limiting how judges 
analyze text, construction would have to be confined to underdeterminate 
cases—where interpretation and tools to discover semantic meaning alone 
were insufficient to resolve the case. We would expect to see evidence that 
the Justices consistently looked at whether the text was ambiguous. First, we 
would expect to see the Justices look only at linguistic evidence of semantic 
meaning. Only if the text remained ambiguous—if interpretation was 
insufficient to render the text determinate—would they proceed to the 
construction zone to give legal effect to the text based on substantive norms. 
So, is that what the Justices did? Not exactly. The Justices did not 
consistently treat ambiguity as a threshold question, an approach we would 
expect if they confined “construction” only to underdeterminate cases. As 
this Part discusses, we do not see the Justices first look only at linguistic 
evidence of semantic meaning, state that the text remained ambiguous, and 
only then proceed to the “construction zone” to give legal effect to the text 
based on substantive norms. 
Instead, the cases illustrate two elements of the Justices’ approaches. 
First, the Justices alternated between considering linguistic meaning and 
substantive norms to render the text determinate by giving effect to the 
drafters’ purpose. That is, the Justices engaged in both interpretation and 
construction in a unified process. Section A describes this approach and 
considers three illustrative opinions as examples of where the Justices did 
not follow a sequential process. It then considers evidence that Chief Justice 
Marshall employed a more sequential approach. Second, the Justices found 
neither textual nor normative rationales consistently determinative in 
resolving the dispute before them. Section B describes this finding by 
 
 90 See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 21, at 783–84 (arguing that judicial discretion in 
construction is more likely to be inconsistent and produce less representative results than an original 
methods approach outlined by the authors). 
 91 Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 495. 
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contrasting cases where the Justices found textual rationales compelling with 
cases where normative rationales won out. Section C then discusses the 
implications of this evidence for the interpretation-construction distinction 
and the limitations on judicial activity in the construction zone. 
A. Alternatively Interpreting and Constructing in a Single Process 
Instead of a sequential, two-step approach from interpretation to 
construction, where the Justices proceed into the construction zone only after 
finding the text ambiguous and underdeterminate, we find the Justices 
alternatively interpreting and constructing in a single process. This Section 
discusses several opinions in illustrative cases where the Justices alternated 
between linguistic and normative premises to give effect to the purpose 
underlying the law: Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull, Justice 
Paterson’s opinion in Hylton v. United States, and Justice Chase’s opinion in 
Ware v. Hylton. This Section then considers evidence that Chief Justice 
Marshall engaged in a more sequential approach by examining his opinion 
in Pennington v. Coxe. 
1. Calder v. Bull—Justice Chase 
Take, for example, Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull, as 
previously discussed. Justice Chase alternated between considering text and 
substantive norms, and found in this case that text ultimately controlled.92 
Justice Chase alternately considered semantic meaning and normative 
premises: he looked at the plain meaning of “ex post facto,” then the 
Framers’ intent that the phrase exclude private rights, and then the canon 
against surplusage. He noted that ex post facto laws are legal terms of art, 
considered meaning in light of the purpose to constrict unjust legislative acts, 
and then appealed to separation of powers and substantive canons to find that 
ex post facto cannot mean merely retroactive.93 
In Calder, Justice Chase alternated between grammatical canons of 
legal terms of art and surplusage, then separation of powers and federalism 
canons, before returning to textual considerations to determine the case.94 
Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder also demonstrates that while the Justice 
 
 92 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 392 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“[It] is not within the letter of the prohibition; 
and, for the reasons assigned, I am clearly of opinion, that it is not within the intention of the prohibition; 
and if within the intention, but out of the letter, I should not, therefore, consider myself justified to 
continue it within the prohibition.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 93 See supra notes 71−72. 
 94 See supra notes 65–80. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
168 
acknowledged where the text was vague or ambiguous, he did not necessarily 
treat it as a threshold issue for proceeding into the construction zone.95 
2. Hylton v. United States—Justice Paterson 
Consider next Hylton v. United States, in which Justice Paterson 
similarly alternated between linguistic analysis of the term tax, evidence of 
the intent of the Framers, and historical context.96 In Hylton, the Justices 
offered seriatim opinions that examined the word “duties” in the Taxing 
Clause and whether a federal statute taxing carriages represented a direct tax, 
which would require it be administered by a rule of apportionment.97 Justice 
Paterson began his opinion by stating that “duty” and “tax” were 
ambiguous.98 He then noted that the Framers clearly intended to give 
Congress plenary authority to levy taxes.99 Justice Paterson asserted that the 
term tax is a “genus” that includes direct taxes, duties, imposts, excises, and 
all other indirect taxes.100 He reiterated that the Framers intended to directly 
tax only enslaved people and land by the rule of apportionment. He offered 
support by examining the particular history of the states at the time of the 
Framing and called it a pragmatic compromise to placate southern states.101 
Southern states were home to a large number of enslaved people and had 
more land that was sparsely settled and not extensively farmed.102 Most other 
states were more densely settled and farmed a higher portion of their land.103 
Justice Paterson found that the Framers drafted the Taxing Clause to address 
these diverging interests by taxing enslaved people and land by 
apportionment.104 He rejected “extending” the rule of apportionment by 
“construction,” because while it represented a necessary compromise in the 
 
 95 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 (opinion of Chase, J.) (The phrase “ex post facto” “naked and 
without explanation . . . is unintelligible, and means nothing.”). 
 96 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 176 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“What is the natural and common, or technical and appropriate, 
meaning of the words, duty and excise, it is not easy to ascertain. They present no clear and precise idea 
to the mind. Different persons will annex different significations to the terms.”). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 177 (“Local considerations, and the particular circumstances, and relative situation of the 
states, naturally lead to this view of the subject. The provision was made in favor of the southern States.”). 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 179 (“The southern states, if no provision had been introduced in the Constitution, would 
have been wholly at the mercy of the other states. Congress in such case, might tax slaves, at discretion 
or arbitrarily, and land in every part of the Union after the same rate or measure: so much a head in the 
first instance, and so much an acre in the second. To guard them against imposition in these particulars, 
was the reason of introducing the clause in the Constitution, which directs that representatives and direct 
taxes shall be apportioned among the states, according to their respective numbers.”). 
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Constitution, treating enslaved people differently from property could not 
“be supported by any solid reasoning.”105 Justice Paterson added that 
population is not directly correlated with wealth, which also weighed 
“against the extension of the principle laid down in the Constitution.”106 He 
noted that while “[a]n equal rule [was] doubtless the best,” apportioning a 
tax on carriages—requiring each state to pay an equal amount—“would be 
oppressive and pernicious.”107 It would mean that if only one or two people 
in the state owned carriages, they would have to pay the whole amount, 
which “would be absurd, and inequitable.”108 Justice Paterson closed by 
affirming that a tax on each carriage would appropriately assess the tax 
burden on the purchaser of a commodity.109 
Justice Paterson did not consider linguistic and substantive canons as 
discrete steps in a sequential process. Instead, he alternated between textual 
and normative reasoning in determining the meaning of the text. 
Furthermore, Justice Paterson did not consider ambiguity or irreducible 
vagueness as a threshold issue before moving into the construction zone. 
3. Ware v. Hylton—Justice Chase 
In Ware v. Hylton, Justice Chase looked at purpose before breaking 
down the text of the treaty to examine the meaning of each phrase.110 He 
determined the meaning of some clauses based on plain meaning, others on 
technical meaning, and another based on intent.111 In Ware, a British subject 
sued to recover his debts that were confiscated during the war under a 
Virginia law. The Justices delivered seriatim opinions determining whether 
this was possible when the final peace treaty with Great Britain did not 
explicitly provide for such recovery.112 Justice Chase first considered 
whether Virginia had the right to pass the law in question.113 He noted that 
upon declaring independence from Britain, the people of Virginia delegated 
their sovereign power to the state legislature.114 He concluded that the 
Virginia legislature had the power to confiscate British debts, reasoning that 
if Congress had the power to do so, that the same reasoning applied to 
 
 105 Id. at 177−78 (“The Constitution has been considered as an accommodating system; it was the 
effect of mutual sacrifices and concessions; it was the work of compromise. The rule of apportionment is 
of this nature; it is radically wrong; it cannot be supported by any solid reasoning.”). 
 106 Id. at 178. 
 107 Id. at 178–79. 
 108 Id. at 179. 
 109 Id. at 180–81. 
 110 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 111 Id. at 241–45. 
 112 Id. at 230. 
 113 Id. at 223. 
 114 Id. 
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Virginia as a sovereign state at the time.115 Justice Chase then looked at the 
preamble of the Virginia act, which specifically stated that debts should not 
be confiscated.116 However, he noted that, preamble notwithstanding, where 
substantive provisions clearly expressed the intention of the legislature, 
“there is no room for construction.”117 Justice Chase proceeded to interpret 
the substantive provisions of the Virginia statute to authorize acts that 
essentially confiscated debts, paying particular attention to the word 
“confiscate.”118 Justice Chase then turned to the treaty ending the 
Revolutionary War to determine whether its provisions nullified the Virginia 
statute,119 citing the Constitution to affirm the supremacy of the treaty over 
the Virginia law.120 
Justice Chase began his analysis of the treaty with the drafters’ 
purposes,121 which included the return of confiscated debts. He also noted 
that the drafters would have known that laws like Virginia’s existed,122 and 
would have drafted with that background knowledge.123 Justice Chase noted 
that the fifth article of the treaty addressed the purpose to restore confiscated 
British debts,124 and that the fourth article specifically provided that 
“creditors, on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the 
recovery of the full value, in sterling money, of all bona fide debts, heretofore 
contracted.”125 Justice Chase cited two treatises as guidance in interpreting 
treaties,126 concluding that “[i]f the recovery of the present debt is not within 
 
 115 Id. at 224. 
 116 Id. at 233. 
 117 Id. (“[I]f the words or effect and operation, of the enacting clause, are ambiguous or doubtful, 
such construction should be made as not to extend the provisions in the enacting clause, beyond the 
intention of the legislature, so clearly expressed in the preamble; but if the words in the enacting clause, 
in their nature, import, and common understanding, are not ambiguous, but plain and clear, and their 
operation and effect certain, there is no room for construction.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 118 Id. at 233–34. 
 119 Id. at 235. 
 120 Id. at 237. 
 121 Id. at 238. 
 122 Id. (“The following facts were of the most public notoriety, at the time when the treaty was made, 
and therefore must have been very well known to the gentleman who assented to it.”). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 238−39. 
 125 Id. at 239 (emphasis omitted). 
 126 Id. at 239−40 (“The intention of the framers of the treaty, must be collected from a view of the 
whole instrument, and from the words made use of by them to express their intention, or from probable 
or rational conjectures. If the words express the meaning of the parties plainly, distinctly, and perfectly, 
there ought to be no other means of interpretation; but if the words are obscure, or ambiguous, or 
imperfect, recourse must be had to other means of interpretation, and in these three cases, we must collect 
the meaning from the words, or from probable or rational conjectures, or from both. When we collect the 
intention from the words only, as they lie in the writing before us, it is a literal interpretation; and indeed 
if the words, and the construction of a writing, are clear and precise, we can scarce call it interpretation 
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the clear and manifest intention and letter of the [fourth] article of the treaty, 
and if it was not intended by it to annul the law of Virginia,” then the Virginia 
law should stand.127 
After framing his analysis around intent, Justice Chase then analyzed 
the text.128 He broke the fourth article down into component phrases and 
analyzed them separately: from “it is agreed,” “that creditors on either side,” 
and “shall meet with no lawful impediment,” to “to the recovery,” “in the 
full value in sterling money,” “of all bona fide debts,” and “heretofore 
contracted.”129 For some clauses, he looked to plain meaning,130 for some to 
technical meaning,131 and for others to intent.132 He asserted that this 
individual analysis of each part indicated the meaning of the clause as a 
whole.133 Justice Chase noted that “creditors” could not be taken literally; it 
must relate to debts, or the treaty would have provided nothing for British 
creditors, which would be illogical.134 He concluded that “legal impediment” 
referred exclusively to preventing American courts from barring recovery of 
British debts, and thus did not annul the acts of the state legislatures.135 In 
closing, Justice Chase noted that the treaty drafters could not have 
“express[ed] their meaning in more accurate and intelligible words, or in 
words more proper and effectual to carry their intention into execution.”136 
He found “the words, in their natural import, and common use,” allowed the 
British debtor to recover.137 
Thus, Justice Chase did not consider ambiguity or irreducible 
vagueness as a threshold issue, nor did he separately analyze linguistic and 
substantive canons as discrete steps in a sequential process. Instead, he 
alternated between textual and normative reasoning in determining the 
meaning of the text. 
 
to collect the intention of the writer from thence. The principal rule to be observed in literal interpretation, 
is to follow that sense, in respect both of the words, and the construction, which is agreeable to common 
use.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 127 Id. at 240. 
 128 Id. (“I will examine the 4th article of the treaty in its several parts; and endeavor to affix the plain 
and natural meaning of each part.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 129 Id. at 240−42. 
 130 Id. at 240. 
 131 Id. at 241. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 242 (“If the words of the 4th article taken separately, truly bear the meaning I have given 
them, their sense collectively, cannot be mistake, and must be the same.”). 
 134 Id. at 243 (“This adhering to the letter, is to destroy the plain meaning of the provision . . . 
[because] by this construction, nothing was done for British creditors.”). 
 135 Id. at 244. 
 136 Id. at 245 (emphasis omitted). 
 137 Id. 
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4. Sometimes Sequential? Chief Justice Marshall in Pennington v. 
Coxe 
Unlike Justice Chase’s nonsequential reasoning, Chief Justice 
Marshall, at least, seemed to follow the more sequential approach that might 
indicate construction as appropriate only for cases where linguistic meaning 
fails to determine the case. For example, as discussed below, in Pennington 
v. Coxe, Chief Justice Marshall approached his opinion in a sequential 
fashion, considering “construction” only after he had determined that 
linguistic canons could not render the case determinate.138 Chief Justice 
Marshall looked to grammatical canons and other tools of “interpretation,” 
noted that the phrase “duty” was ambiguous, and then proceeded to reason 
based on the context of the legislation’s historical enactment.139 
In Pennington, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, examined 
the implications of a federal statute that repealed a previous act imposing a 
duty on sugar.140 A refiner, left with sugar in his warehouse at the time the 
repeal went into effect, sought to determine whether he still had to pay a duty 
on that sugar.141 Chief Justice Marshall looked at the scope of the language 
in the original statute: whether a tax that shall be “levied, collected and paid 
upon all sugar which shall be refined within the United States” meant that 
the duty began to accrue on the sugar at the moment it was refined, even if it 
had not yet been sent out from the building, or whether the duty was owed 
on the sugar at the moment it left the warehouse.142 He began with the whole 
act,143 considering the second section, which imposed the duty, and the fourth 
section, which laid out the requirements for sugar refiners in rendering 
account of the sugar they refined.144 Chief Justice Marshall discounted other 
statutes that were argued to be in pari materia,145 asserting that “a law is the 
best expositor of itself, [and] that every part of an act is to be taken into view, 
for the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature.”146 Considering all 
sections of an act was “among those plain rules laid down by common sense 
for the exposition of statutes which have been uniformly acknowledged.”147 
 
 138 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33 (1804). 
 139 Id. at 51. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 51−52 (emphasis omitted). 
 143 Id. at 52–53 (“[T]he details of one part may contain regulations restricting the extent of general 
expressions used in another part of the same act.”). 
 144 Id. at 52 (“Other sections of this act have been relied on by the counsel on both sides, and the 
phraseology of the law, in other acts said to be in pari materia has been brought into view.”). 
 145 Or, for those who prefer plain English: in light of other statutes. 
 146 Id. at 52. 
 147 Id. at 52–53. 
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In order to interpret these sections together, Chief Justice Marshall 
found it necessary “to ascertain with precision the import of the words 
[levied, collected and paid].”148 He looked at their placement in a list of verbs 
acting on the same object,149 noting that even if they were not synonymous, 
they were at least “co-extensive in their operation.”150 From there, Chief 
Justice Marshall asserted that if the terms “collected” and “paid” were used 
elsewhere in the act to refer to sugars to be refined––as opposed to sugars 
that have been refined and sent out of the building––then this would indicate 
that the tax was levied on sugar that had not yet left the warehouse, a result 
the statute could not have been aiming at.151 Chief Justice Marshall found 
that the fifth section described only the time of payment, and did not 
explicitly limit the imposition of the duty in the second section.152 He then 
asked if the more specific terms in the fifth section––regarding timing and 
payment––restricted the more general terms in the earlier section, but found 
it was ambiguous.153 
Thus far, Chief Justice Marshall appeared to be interpreting; however, 
after noting the ambiguity, he turned to the history of the legislation’s 
enactment. He asserted that the object of the act was to generate revenue, not 
discourage manufacture, and that “unless the words require that 
construction,” the meaning must be determined in light of that purpose to 
generate revenue.154 He observed that the law’s tax-generating provisions 
referred “exclusively to sugars sent out of the building.”155 Chief Justice 
Marshall noted that common legislative practice indicated that the legislature 
intended to impose a tax on the sugar immediately upon being refined,156 but 
rejected it because “this construction would be admitted to conflict with the 
obvious meaning of the law.”157 He dismissed the fifth section’s requirement 
of daily accounting as not indicative of legislative intent to impose the duty 
immediately after refinement because the accounting was instead designed 
to prevent fraud.158 
 
 148 Id. at 53. 
 149 Id. at 53–54. 
 150 Id. at 54. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 54–55. 
 153 Id. at 55 (“It is one on which the most correct minds may form opposite opinions, without exciting 
surprise.”). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 56. 
 157 Id. at 57. 
 158 Id. 
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Chief Justice Marshall also dismissed a further argument analogizing 
the sugar tax to a different tax on home-distilled spirits on separation of 
powers grounds: where the legislature made a political decision to 
distinguish between home-distilled spirits and sugar, it was not for the Court 
to find them analogous.159 He affirmed that “[i]t is the duty of the court to 
discover the intention of the legislature, and to respect that intention.”160 
Chief Justice Marshall reiterated that it was “most apparently the object of 
the legislature” in creating the system of duties and excises “to tax expense 
and not industry.”161 After engaging in both modern “interpretation” and 
“construction,” Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the duty did not accrue 
until the sugars left the building—and thus that the refiner was not bound to 
pay the duty on the sugar that remained in his warehouse when the repeal 
went into effect.162 
As his opinion in Pennington indicates, Chief Justice Marshall, at least, 
relied at least once on a more sequential approach, considering vagueness or 
ambiguity as a threshold issue before considering any evidence beyond plain 
meaning, even other linguistic canons. If the text had a clear meaning, then 
there was no room for the Justice to utilize other grammatical canons to 
interpret the text beyond that clear meaning. However, the Justice did not 
treat this as a threshold for moving from textual indications of semantic 
meaning (interpretation) to normative premises (construction), but as a 
requirement before considering anything other than plain meaning. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s sequential approach in Pennington therefore 
only partially maps onto Professor Solum’s interpretation-construction 
distinction, as ambiguity was not a threshold consideration before Chief 
Justice Marshall proceeded to consider substantive canons and legal norms, 
but rather a threshold question before considering any evidence beyond plain 
meaning. It is thus still consistent with the broader trend that the Justices did 
not confine construction––considering legal norms or substantive canons––
to underdeterminate cases where linguistic canons alone could not resolve 
the issue. Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder, Justice Paterson’s opinion in 
Hylton, and Justice Chase’s opinion in Ware illustrate how the Justices 
alternated between interpretation and construction, rather than engaging in a 
sequential process of analysis. In practice, the Justices did not observe the 
 
 159 Id. at 59 (“Those political motives which induce the legislature to select objects of revenue and 
to tax them under particular circumstances, are not for judicial consideration. Where the legislature 
distinguishes between different objects, and in imposing a duty on them evidences a will to charge them 
in different situations, it is not for the courts to beat down these distinctions on the allegation that they 
are capriciously made, and therefore to be disregarded.”). 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 61−62. 
 162 Id. 
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interpretation-construction distinction as a limiting principle on their ability 
to consider linguistic and normative reasoning together, in order to resolve 
the meaning of the text before them. 
B. Neither Textual nor Normative Concerns Were  
Consistently Determinative 
For it to limit judicial discretion, judges should reach construction—
analyzing meaning based on substantive legal norms—only after finding 
interpretation insufficient and concluding that linguistic reasoning alone 
cannot determine meaning. Under this sequential two-step model, textual 
concerns are determinative in all cases, unless and until the judges find that 
linguistic reasoning cannot determine the meaning of the text. Only in those 
cases can the judges consider normative reasoning, and only in those cases 
can the judges find that normative concerns govern. If, as Section A 
described, the Justices alternated between interpretation and construction, 
considering both linguistic and substantive canons in a single process, did 
textual or normative reasoning govern? Did the Justices observe any 
limitations on which kinds of reasoning they found ultimately persuasive in 
determining the meaning of the text before them? 
In brief, no. The Justices found neither textual nor normative rationales 
consistently determinative in resolving the dispute before them. This Section 
describes this finding by contrasting cases where the Justices found textual 
rationales compelling with cases where normative rationales won out. 
1. Look No Further Than the Text 
In some cases, the Justices found that more textual rationales 
outweighed normative considerations. In Bas v. Tingy, the Justices authored 
four seriatim opinions on the rate of salvage that applied to a ship captured 
from the French.163 One law, enacted in June 1798, referred to salvage of 
ships that were “re-captures from the French”; a second law, enacted in 
March 1799, referred to “re-captures from the enemy.”164 The two laws 
provided for different rates of salvage, and so the Justices determined 
whether “the enemy” in the second act referred only to the French as in the 
first act, or whether it provided generally for any enemy of the United States 
in a future war.165 The Justices utilized various approaches to answering this 
question. 
 
 163 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
 164 Id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
 165 Id. 
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Justice Moore noted that the case “depend[ed] on the construction of 
the act, for the regulation of the navy.”166 He rejected dictionary definitions 
of the word “enemy,”167 noting that since “our situation is so 
extraordinary . . . I doubt whether a parallel case can be traced in the history 
of nations,” and thus a literal definition could not resolve the issue.168 He 
looked to the idea the word “enemy” represented, and found it referred to the 
official state of war.169 Justice Moore ultimately resolved the issue on a 
broader principle: where two laws were inconsistent, “the latter is a virtual 
repeal of the former, without any express declaration on the subject.”170 
Justice Washington, on the other hand, looked to the realities of 
hostilities between France and the United States when the laws were 
passed.171 He rejected the argument that Congress did not consider those 
hostilities an outright war, even though none of the laws before March of 
1799 referred to France as the “enemy” or officially declared war against 
France.172 Justice Washington further noted that while the 1799 act 
authorized some captures not covered by previous laws, it could cover both 
previously authorized captures and prospective ones.173 He argued that 
implied repeals were inappropriate based on separation of powers,174 except 
where there was “sufficient evidence of such a change in the legislative 
will.”175 Justice Washington then looked for that “evidence of legislative 
will.”176 He found it in a separate section of the same act referring to “prizes” 
taken from the enemy: “[t]his then is a legislative interpretation of the word 
enemy; and if the enemy as to prizes, surely they preserve the same character 
as to re-captures.”177 He confirmed this was the appropriate meaning in light 
of the purpose of enacting the 1799 law both to provide for salvage for re-
 
 166 Id. at 39 (opinion of Moore, J.). 
 167 Id. at 39 (“A number of books have been cited to furnish a glossary on the word enemy; yet, our 
situation is so extraordinary, that I doubt whether a parallel case can be traced in the history of nations.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. (“But, if words are the representatives of ideas, let me ask, by what other word the idea of the 
relative situation of America and France could be communicated, than by that of hostility, or war?” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 170 Id. at 40. 
 171 Id. (opinion of Washington, J.). 
 172 Id. at 40–41. 
 173 Id. at 41−42. 
 174 Id. at 42. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
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captured ships and to condition the rate proportional to the amount of risk 
taken in re-capturing the ship.178 
Next, Justice Chase looked to four other acts from this period to 
demonstrate that at the time the second law was passed, France was still an 
enemy, even if Congress had not formally declared war.179 Justice Chase 
relied on text to reject the argument that Congress intended the 1799 law to 
refer only to future cases where Congress officially declared war.180 Finally, 
Justice Paterson followed an approach similar to Justice Washington and 
looked to other sections of the act to determine the appropriate meaning of 
the word “enemy” based on legislative intent.181 Like Justice Washington, 
Justice Paterson found that the section discussing “prizes” referred 
exclusively to France, which was determinative of legislative intent that “the 
enemy” refer to the French.182 Thus, as these opinions demonstrate, textual 
considerations alone were sufficient for all four Justices to resolve some 
cases. 
2.  . . . Except When Normative Reasoning Is More Compelling 
Though in some cases the Justices found textual reasoning alone 
sufficient, they resolved other cases on pragmatic or normative grounds.183 
For example, in Hylton v. United States, Justice Iredell’s opinion found “the 
Constitution itself . . . a clear guide to decide the controversy”: Congress had 
the power to tax anything, in any way it wanted, except for imposing a duty 
on exports.184 Justice Iredell inferred from constitutional silence on the 
subject that the tax on carriages should be uniform: the Constitution was 
“particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states,” because this was 
“the leading distinction between the Articles of Confederation and the 
present Constitution.”185 He then relied on logic—if all direct taxes must be 
 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 43−44 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 180 Id. at 44−45. 
 181 Id. at 46 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“Besides, the intention of the legislature as to the meaning of 
this word, enemy, is clearly deducible from the act for the government of the navy, passed the 2d of 
March 1799. This act embraces the past, present, and future, and contains passages, which point the 
character of enemy at the French, in the most clear and irresistible manner.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 182 Id. 
 183 See, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (“[I]t is sufficient to observe, that 
practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the 
judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary 
interpretation of the most forcible nature.”); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 
(1801); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 260 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“These are considerations 
of policy, considerations of extreme magnitude, and certainly entirely incompetent to the examination 
and decision of a Court of Justice.”); see also infra note 249. 
 184 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 181 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
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apportioned, then if the tax on carriages could not be apportioned, it was not 
a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution.186 Justice Iredell relied 
on the federalism canon to reject a uniform tax on the states as “arbitrary” 
and against the “common interest.”187 
Similarly, recall Justice Paterson’s opinion in Hylton.188 Justice 
Paterson considered textual and normative reasoning in tandem to determine 
the Framers’ intent. He began by considering linguistic canons to resolve the 
meaning of the words “duty” and “tax.” He then reasoned by way of history, 
based on the context of slaveholding states at the time of the Framing. Justice 
Paterson found that the Framers drafted the Taxing Clause to address the 
diverging interests of the northern and southern states by taxing enslaved 
people and land by apportionment.189 He rejected “extending” the rule of 
apportionment by “construction,” because while it represented a necessary 
compromise in the Constitution, treating enslaved people differently from 
other property could not “be supported by any solid reasoning.”190 
Textual reasoning was determinative for the Justices in some cases––
except where it was not. As discussed in this Section, in alternating between 
linguistic and substantive reasoning, the Justices weighed all kinds of 
evidence to resolve the meaning of the text before them. This approach did 
not observe the limiting principle of confining normative considerations to a 
construction zone, reached only after textual considerations proved 
insufficient to resolve ambiguous or vague text. 
C. Implications for Contemporary Debates 
Evidence from these early American cases more closely tracks 
Professor Solum’s clarification of the interpretation-construction 
distinction—that in practice, the Justices moved back and forth between 
interpretation and construction, or even engaged in them simultaneously. 
These early cases indicate that at least some of the Justices in practice did 
indeed alternate between construction and interpretation rather than 
engaging in a two-step process with a discrete interpretation phase followed 
by a discrete construction phase. Construction was not confined only to 
underdeterminate cases: there is mixed evidence in early American judicial 
 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 183 (“Such an arbitrary method of taxing different states differently, is a suggestion 
altogether new, and would lead, if practiced, to such dangerous consequences, that it will require very 
powerful arguments to shew [sic] . . . I deem it utterly irreconcilable, it being altogether destructive of the 
notion of a common interest, upon which the very principles of the Constitution are founded, so far as the 
condition of the United States will admit.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 188 See supra Section III.A.2. 
 189 Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
 190 Id. at 177−78. 
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practice that the Justices engaged in construction both where meaning was 
underdeterminate and where it was determinate. 
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport describe a single step of 
interpretation.191 The early evidence described herein could support this 
position as far as process goes. However, the Justices considered a variety of 
evidence in this single phase of interpretation. Professors McGinnis and 
Rappaport might consider that all these tools and considerations 
appropriately fall within a thick interpretation stage, but this does not lend 
itself to a clear limiting principle on how judges can proceed within this thick 
interpretation stage. The early Justices analyzed text in one step during which 
they considered both linguistic and normative considerations, and neither 
text nor normative reasoning was consistently determinative. The Justices 
had more leeway in weighing evidence to determine the meaning of the text 
at hand. 
This trend illustrates a tension between the idea that judicial discretion 
in construction should be limited and the idea that modern judges’ approach 
to interpretation and construction should be guided by early American 
judicial practice. On the one hand, some original methods originalists argue 
that judicial discretion in construction should be limited.192 On the other 
hand, some of those same original methods originalists argue that original 
methods, those used at the Founding and by the Founders, should guide how 
judges get from words to law, at least when interpreting the Constitution.193 
This Part described how early American judicial practice does not neatly 
align with an approach to interpretation and construction that limits judicial 
discretion. Rather than engaging in a consistent two-step sequential process 
with discrete modes of analysis, early American Justices alternated between 
considering linguistic meaning and substantive norms to render the text 
determinate by giving effect to the drafters’ purpose, engaging in both 
interpretation and construction in a unified process.194 
Perhaps reconciling these two ideas is as simple as saying that judicial 
practice is not the best evidence of interpretive methods at the Founding. Or 
that the methods used from 1795 to 1805 are not close enough to the 
Founding to be authoritative. But highlighting this tension is important, 
 
 191 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 21, at 752–53. Professors McGinnis and Rappaport describe 
a single step because, as a positive and normative matter, they argue that construction is not justified. See 
id. 
 192 See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 21, at 783–84 (arguing that judicial discretion in 
construction is more likely to be inconsistent and produce less representative results than an original 
methods approach outlined by the authors). 
 193 See, e.g., id. at 752 (arguing that the Constitution, at least, should be interpreted using the 
interpretive rules its enactors would have used). 
 194 See supra Part III. 
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because it at least prompts the question of whether these two imperatives can 
be reconciled, and if so, how? Answers to such questions are far beyond the 
scope of this Note, but they do provide some grist for the mill. 
IV. A VARIETY OF “ACCEPTABLE” TOOLS IN THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
Further grist for the mill is found in the second trend in the historical 
evidence, discussed in this Part: that early American Justices used a variety 
of tools in the construction zone. Another key component of the 
interpretation-construction distinction concerns the tools judges should use 
once in the construction zone. Where a term is vague or irreducibly 
ambiguous, Professor Solum acknowledges that judges may determine that 
interpretation alone is insufficient to ascertain a term’s meaning; judges can 
then rely on additional tools of construction in the construction zone.195 He 
also distinguishes between tools appropriately used in the “interpretation,” 
as opposed to the “construction,” stage.196 According to Professor Solum, 
interpretation relies exclusively on linguistic facts and canons to justify the 
“correct” meaning of the text; in contrast, construction is justified by legal 
norms.197 Scholars, however, differ regarding which tools of statutory 
construction judges can appropriately use in the construction zone, and 
consequently, what kinds of evidence reliably indicate textual meaning.198 
In early practice, the Justices relied on a variety of evidence in the 
construction zone. They did so not merely to render underdetermined text 
sufficiently specific to resolve the case, but more broadly in considering all 
available evidence of the drafters’ intent. This Part first examines linguistic 
and grammatical canons, before turning to the substantive canons and legal 
norms the Justices commonly relied on. It concludes by evaluating the 
implications for debate regarding the appropriate tools in the construction 
zone. 
A. Linguistic or Grammatical Canons 
The Justices frequently relied on the linguistic canons of plain meaning, 
related words, the whole act canon, in pari materia, and the canon against 
surplusage. The Justices did not consistently begin their analysis with the 
plain meaning of the text, but they often acknowledged plain meaning.199 
 
 195 See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 6, at 108. 
 196 See id. at 113–14. 
 197 See id. at 104. 
 198 See id. at 108; see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 123–26 (2004). 
 199 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (“[T]he plain import of the 
words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it 
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They also considered where the legal or technical meaning of a term was 
more appropriate.200 As Justice Scalia would have been delighted to note, in 
some cases the Justices cited dictionary definitions as reference.201 
The Justices relied on several rules to achieve internal grammatical 
consistency within a particular clause. They looked to the other words in the 
clause to provide context for the meaning of the term at issue.202 In some 
cases, this included finding that the level of generality of some terms in the 
clause indicated that the other terms in the clause should be interpreted at the 
same level of generality.203 In other cases, the Justices inferred meaning from 
the sequence of terms, based on whether more specific terms followed more 
general ones;204 this also included inferring meaning from the relationship 
between items in a list under the noscitur a sociis or ejusdem generis 
 
is appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an 
additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their obvious meaning.”); 
Turner v. Fendall, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 117, 131 (1801) (“The words must be very plain indeed which will 
force a court to put upon them so irrational a construction as this.”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 
390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law concerning, and 
after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is this; that the 
Legislatures of the several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by a subject, or citizen, which shall 
have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it.” (emphasis omitted)); Ware v. Hylton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 240 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“I will examine the 4th article of the treaty in its 
several parts; and endeavor to affix the plain and natural meaning of each part.” (emphasis omitted)); id. 
at 243 (“This adhering to the letter, is to destroy the plain meaning of the provision.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 200 See, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 391 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“The expressions ‘ex post facto 
laws’ are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate 
meaning, by Legislators, Lawyers, and Authors.” (emphasis omitted)); Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 241 
(opinion of Chase, J.) (“Bona fide is a legal technical expression; and the law of Great Britain and this 
country has annexed a certain idea to it.” (emphasis omitted)); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
171, 176 (1796) (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“What is the natural and common, or technical and appropriate, 
meaning of the words, duty and excise, it is not easy to ascertain.”). 
 201 See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 39 (1800) (opinion of Moore, J.) (“A number of books 
have been cited to furnish a glossary on the word enemy; yet, our situation is so extraordinary, that I doubt 
whether a parallel case can be traced in the history of nations.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 202 See, e.g., Faw v. Marsteller, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 10, 24 (1804) (“To understand in this sense the 
words of the act which are considered as restrictive, does not appear to the court to be such a violence to 
their natural import as to be inadmissible; and to understand them in this sense reconciles the different 
parts of the clause with each other.”); Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 278 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“These words 
must be construed as relative to the former, for the whole clause must be taken together.”). 
 203 See, e.g., Faw, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 28 (“The terms used in the third member of the sentence are 
certainly very comprehensive, and their general natural import does not appear to be so restrained by their 
connection with other parts of the section, as necessarily to confine their operation to cases where debtors 
only can derive advantage from them.”). 
 204 See, e.g., id. at 23 (“[T]he terms used in the first part of the section are such, that if they stood 
alone, they would include, in their letter, the case at bar: but it is contended, that there are subsequent 
words which limit those just quoted, so as to restrain their operation to contracts capable of being 
extinguished.”). 
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canons.205 The Justices also avoided interpretations that expanded exceptions 
to swallow a general rule, particularly where the text enumerated specific 
exceptions to a general term.206 
The Justices also interpreted clauses together to achieve grammatical 
consistency of the act as a whole.207 For example, in one case, they 
specifically noted that more specific subsequent clauses governed more 
general language in earlier clauses.208 In another case, the Justices found a 
later section did not apply to interpreting an earlier one where the two 
sections addressed different topics.209 One case in particular noted that where 
substantive provisions seemed to conflict with the preamble, the substantive 
provisions should govern; they were sequentially later, thus indicating that 
 
 205 See, e.g., Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 53–54 (1804) (looking at the phrase “levied, 
collected, and paid” and reasoning that “[e]ach of these words implies a charge upon the article, and if 
either of them had been used singly, no doubt could have been entertained that the article would have 
been burthened with the tax. They present to the mind distinct ideas, and when used together seem to 
designate distinct actions required by the law . . . . But, however, this may be, they act on the same subject 
and at the same time. The object of each verb is precisely the same . . . . It has then been very correctly 
said, that these words, though not synonimous [sic], are certainly as they stand in the sentence, co-
extensive in their operation. They reach and embrace the same article at the same time.”); Hylton, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) at 174 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“Duties, imposts, and excises, were enumerated, after the 
general term taxes, only for the purpose of declaring, that they were to be laid by the rule of uniformity.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 206 See, e.g., Faw, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 27−28, 30 (“In reasoning from the words of the law, they say, 
that the two cases put, are by way of example” and represent the general rule that court should exercise 
equitable power for benefit of debtor; “the exception, if it receives the construction which the court seems 
inclined to give it, would destroy the rule.”); id. at 23 (“When those who introduced these exceptions, 
were so very cautious as expressly to take a contract for tobacco, or other specific property, out of the 
operations of a law made solely for money contracts, there are additional inducements to believe that 
every possible contract, not included within the exceptions, was designed to be comprehended in the 
general rule.”). 
 207 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804) (interpreting meaning by looking at 
1st and 5th sections of the act together); Pennington, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 52–53 (“That a law is the best 
expositor of itself, that every part of an act is to be taken into view, for the purpose of discovering the 
mind of the legislature; and that the details of one part may contain regulations restricting the extent of 
general expressions used in another part of the same act, are among those plain rules laid down by 
common sense for the exposition of statutes which have been uniformly acknowledged.”); Wiscart v. 
Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 326 (1796) (opinion of Wilson, J.) (“By so doing, the two sections of the 
law can be reconciled; and, by so doing, without including admiralty causes, every description of suit 
may be reasonably satisfied.”). 
 208 See Pennington, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 54 (“If then the other parts of the act demonstrate, that the 
words collected and paid, have not for their object all sugars to be refined, this section is necessarily 
restrained in its operation by those which follow and designate more particularly what is in the first 
instance expressed in general terms.”). 
 209 See Priestman v. United States, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 28, 34 (1800) (“But it is too plain for argument, 
that this section cannot, by any fair and rational construction, be made to refer to the 19th section. It is 
inapplicable, because the objects are entirely different.”). 
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the legislature may have changed its intention.210 Additionally, the Justices 
sought consistency in interpreting statutes with common purposes as in pari 
materia and construed them together.211 They found that without clear terms 
in a later statute specifying that it was modifying the earlier one, it was not 
appropriate to imply amendment or appeal of the earlier statute.212 
The Justices commonly relied upon the canon against surplusage in 
interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions.213 In at least one instance, 
Justice Chase opted for an interpretation that would render part of the clause 
mere surplusage because otherwise the interpretation would be inconsistent 
with common law tradition.214 Avoiding surplusage never appeared 
determinative; the Justices considered possible surplusage as one of multiple 
indications of the appropriate meaning.215 
B. Substantive Canons and Legal Norms 
The Justices relied on a variety of evidence and normative premises to 
support a particular possible meaning; this included historical context at the 
time of drafting, legislative history of the drafters’ purpose, and separation 
of powers and federalism canons. The Justices often considered historical 
 
 210 See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 233 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“It is not an 
uncommon case for a legislature, in a preamble, to declare their intention to provide for certain cases, or 
to punish certain offenses, and in enacting clauses to include other cases, and other offences . . . . If the 
preamble is contradicted by the enacting clause, as to the intention of the legislature, it must prevail, on 
the principle that the legislature changed their intention.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 211 See, e.g., Pennington, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 58 (discussing “that all the revenue acts of the United 
States” should be looked at “as in pari materia, as forming one connected system, and therefore to be 
compared together, when any one of them is to be construed”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 
33 (1801) (“[I]f one part of the system shall be manifestly founded on this construction of the other part, 
it would have considerable weight in rendering certain what might before have been doubtful.”). 
 212 See, e.g., Sims v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 460 (1799) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“I should deem 
it unwarranted to extend it to any others by construction of a subsequent law, without plain words of 
extension, unless there was an irresistible implication to authorise it.”). 
 213 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“The subsequent part of the 
section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction . . . . It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a 
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801) (“On any other construction the word definitive would be rendered useless 
and inoperative.”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 397 (1798) (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“Where is 
the necessity or use of the latter words, if a law impairing the obligation of contracts, be comprehended 
within the terms ex post facto law?”). 
 214 See, e.g., Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 401, 407 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (rejecting an 
interpretation that “is inconsistent with the nature of a common law judgment; it must be treated as mere 
surplusage”). 
 215 See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175 (“If any other construction would render the clause 
inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their 
obvious meaning.”). 
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context at the time of drafting to shed light on the meaning of the text.216 In 
one instance, Justice Iredell highlighted the importance of examining the 
historical events that informed the drafting of the text, and the need to avoid 
considering the intent of the drafters in light of subsequent events.217 
However, the Justices considered the subsequent history of laws where they 
examined two conflicting laws: in both cases in the sample where the Justices 
did so, they found that the later statute effected an implied repeal of the 
earlier act.218 In one case, the Justices approached the basis for the implied 
repeal differently;219 in the second, the Justices agreed that where two laws 
were passed in the same session, in the case of conflict the second should be 
implied to repeal the first.220 The Justices relied on legislative history to 
 
 216 See, e.g., Faw v. Marsteller, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 10, 28 (1804) (“The legislature was performing a 
very extraordinary act. It was interfering in the mass of contracts entered into between the first of January, 
1777, and the first of January, 1782, and ascertaining the value of those contracts, by a rule different from 
that which had been adopted by the parties themselves . . . . This sentiment might produce the fifth 
section, and if it did, the general terms used, ought to be applied to the relief of the injured party, whether 
he was the creditor or the debtor.”); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 389 (opinion of Chase, J.) (“The prohibition 
against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for greater caution, and very probably arose 
from the knowledge, that the Parliament of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such 
laws, under the denomination of bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties . . . . To prevent such, 
and similar, acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State Legislatures were prohibited 
from passing any bill of attainder; or any ex post facto law.” (emphasis omitted); Hylton v. United States, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 181 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“[B]ecause the present Constitution was 
particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states, except in particular cases specified: And this is 
the leading distinction between the articles of Confederation and the present Constitution.”); Penhallow 
v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 112 (1795) (opinion of Blair, J.) (“I take the truth to be, that the 
framers of that instrument were contemplating what powers Congress ought to have had at the beginning; 
and that in reference to the first occasion of their assembling to oppose the tyranny of Great Brittain [sic], 
at least in reference to the time of framing the confederation, say, the states shall retain.”). 
 217 See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 267 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“We are too 
apt, in estimating a law passed at a remote period, to combine in our consideration, all the subsequent 
events which have had an influence upon it, instead of confining ourselves (which we ought to do) to the 
existing circumstances at the time of its passing.”). 
 218 See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40–43 (1800) (opinion of Moore, J.); Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797). 
 219 Compare Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 40 (opinion of Moore, J.) (“But if two laws are inconsistent, (as, 
in my judgment, the laws in question are) the latter is a virtual repeal of the former, without any express 
declaration on the subject.”) with id. at 42 (opinion of Washington, J.) (“[I]f there is sufficient evidence 
of such a change in the legislative will, and the two laws are in collision, we are forced to presume it.”). 
 220 See Brown, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 367 (“[W]hen a question shall arise, whether a law passed during 
any session changes, or repeals, a former law during the same session, which is the present case, the same 
construction shall be made, as if the act of 1785 had never been passed.”). 
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interpret treaties and federal statutes,221 even quoting directly from 
committee reports as evidence of legislative purpose in enacting the text.222 
The Justices also justified their opinions in light of separation of powers 
principles in both constitutional and statutory cases;223 Professor Solum 
would consider this “construction.” The Justices used the canon to explicitly 
reject a possible meaning; they also alluded to it when they discussed the 
appropriate judicial role in interpreting a federal statute, as it constituted the 
product of a coequal branch of government entrusted with lawmaking 
authority.224 In some cases the Justices relied on the substantive separation of 
powers canon to support determining legislative intent.225 The Justices 
frequently and explicitly avoided absurd constructions.226 They also noted 
that acquiescence to longstanding practice could fix meaning, even where 
 
 221 See, e.g., Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 276 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“But I must admit that there is also 
a very high authority, and to which we naturally should be more partial, against this construction. It is the 
authority of the Congress of the United States in the year 1787. It is an authority derived from an [sic] 
unanimous opinion of that truly respectable body, conveyed in a circular letter from Congress to the 
different States on this very subject.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 222 See, e.g., Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 82−85 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (“In the Resolutions of 
Congress of the 6th of March, 1779, is contained a course of reasoning, which, in my opinion, is cogent 
and conclusive . . . . ‘The committee, consisting of Mr. Floyd, Mr. Ellery, and Mr. Burke, to whom was 
referred the report of the committee on appeals of January 19th, 1779, having, in pursuance of the 
instructions to them given, examined into the causes of the refusal of the Judge of the Court of Admiralty 
for the State of Pennsylvania, to carry into execution the decree of the Court or committee of appeals, 
report.”). Justice Paterson continued to quote directly from the report for three pages of the opinion. See 
id. 
 223 See, e.g., Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 260 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“These are considerations of policy, 
considerations of extreme magnitude, and certainly entirely incompetent to the examination and 
definition of a Court of Justice.”); Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 84 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (rejecting “a 
construction which involves many inconveniences and absurdities, destroys an essential part of the power 
of war and peace entrusted to Congress, and would disable the Congress of the United States, from giving 
satisfaction to foreign nations complaining of violation of neutralities, of treaties, or other breaches of the 
law of nations, and would enable a jury, in any one state, to involve the United States in hostilities; a 
construction, which for these and many other reasons, is inadmissible”). 
 224 Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 393 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“If the term ex 
post facto law is to be construed to include and to prohibit the enacting any law after a fact, it will greatly 
restrict the power of the federal and state legislatures; and the consequences of such a construction may 
not be foreseen.”), with Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 42 (opinion of Washington, J.) (“This ground is not taken, 
because such an effect involves an indecent censure upon the legislature for passing contradictory laws.”). 
 225 See, e.g., Sims v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 461 (1799) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“I therefore am 
compelled, upon principles of respect to the Legislature, to abandon this construction.”). 
 226 See, e.g., Wilson v. Mason, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 45, 102 (1801) (“This construction would be 
universally rejected as absurd, and all would expect the court to understand the words more liberally, and 
to expound them so as to give some effect to the legislative will.”); Sims, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 459 (opinion 
of Iredell, J.) (“I confess I have had great difficulty in construing the two Virginia acts, of May, and 
October, 1779, and if the latter act had admitted of such a construction that I could, without absurdity or 
manifest injustice have confined the words ‘or assigns’ in that act, to mean only the heirs or assigns of 
those specially named in the former, I should undoubtedly have preferred that construction.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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the text might indicate otherwise.227 The Justices generally avoided 
interpretations that would apply laws retroactively, but justified doing so in 
one case where national security was at stake.228 
Professor Solum notes that construction includes reliance on norms of 
“the public good,” “equality,” “injustice,” and “equity.”229 The Justices 
frequently reference “just” or “fair” construction in selecting one possible 
meaning in place of another.230 In such instances, the Justices relied on legal 
norms or principles for determining that a given particular meaning was 
appropriate. In some cases those substantive legal norms were more 
complex, such as retroactivity or procedural fairness,231 while in others they 
reflected principles as elemental as consistency or evenhandedness.232 This 
 
 227 See, e.g., United States v. Hooe, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 318, 320 (1803) (“One legislature has taken 
cognizance of the construction given by the court, and has provided for the case, but another legislature 
has repealed that provision and thereby given a subsequent legislative construction, or at least shewn such 
a legislative acquiescence under the construction which this court formerly gave to the act, as is now 
conclusive.”); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (“[I]t is sufficient to observe, that 
practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the 
judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary 
interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken 
or controlled.”). 
 228 See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (“It is true that in 
mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a construction 
which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns where 
individual rights, acquired by war, are sacrificed for national purposes, the contract, making the sacrifice, 
ought always to receive a construction conforming to its manifest import.”). 
 229 Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 510. 
 230 In some cases, “fair” seems to indicate what is “appropriate” rather than a reliance on substantive 
legal norms. Consider Wiscart v. Dauchy, where the Justice used “fair” in the sense of “appropriate.” 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 326 (1796) (“If, however, causes of admiralty jurisdiction are fairly excluded from 
the first member of the 22d section, that provides for a removal from the District to the Circuit Court, 
impartiality and consistency of construction must lead us likewise to exclude them from this member of 
the section, that provides for a removal from the Circuit to the Supreme Court.”). Consider also 
Pennington v. Coxe, where Chief Justice Marshall used “just” to mean appropriate or correct. 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 33, 52 (1804) (“[B]ut as the case depends principally on the just construction of the sections 
which have been quoted, those sections only are stated for the present.”). Given this dual usage, this 
analysis distinguished between where the Justices reference “fair” as appropriate as opposed to utilizing 
“fair” as part of reliance on broader legal norms or principles to justify a particular interpretation. 
 231 See Mason v. Ship Blaireau, where the Justice characterized precedent cases, thus relying on legal 
norms and principles of justice and fairness to argue for given meaning. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240, 270 (1804) 
(“The counsel does not appear to the court to construe that case correctly, when he says, that it does not 
determine the right as between the master and the apprentice. The fair understanding of that case is, that 
the money was decreed to the apprentice, and was to be paid for his benefit.”). See also Faw v. Marsteller, 
where the Justice referred to procedural fairness. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 10, 30 (1804) (“But although the just 
construction of the 5th section of the law, admits a creditor, who would be greatly injured by the 
application of the general rule to his case, to show circumstances which authorise a departure from that 
rule,” it would have to be an extraordinary case.). 
 232 See, for example, Turner v. Fendall, in which the Court rejects “unusual” and “unjust” 
construction that would overly restrict the rights of parties, opting instead for a “fair” construction that 
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reliance on substantive legal norms, even those as fundamental as “fairness” 
and “justice,” distinguishes “construction” as an activity giving legal effect 
from “interpretation” as an activity relying purely on grammatical or 
linguistic reasoning to determine semantic content. 
C. Implications for Debates Regarding “Appropriate” Tools in the 
Construction Zone 
The Justices relied on substantive canons and legislative evidence in a 
manner inconsistent with many scholars’ approach to the tools that are 
“appropriate” for use in the construction zone.233 For example, the Justices 
frequently relied on the absurdity canon to reject the idea that Congress could 
have intended a particular policy outcome.234 The Justices’ reliance on a 
variety of evidence might instead be more consistent with Professor Jack 
Balkin’s description of a broad array of appropriate tools for construction.235 
This Section considers three examples of where the Justices relied on 
evidence that might spark controversy among contemporary jurists and 
theorists who are most concerned with limiting judicial discretion in 
analyzing text: (1) reliance on historical acquiescence, (2) deferring to 
concerns about the national interest, and (3) utilizing legislative evidence. 
1. Relying on Historical Acquiescence 
First, the Justices relied on acquiescence to historical practice as a 
pragmatic resolution to arguably unconstitutional actions. Consider Stuart v. 
Laird, for example. In that case, the Court examined whether a federal statute 
that reconfigured the circuit courts was unconstitutional.236 After a bond was 
issued in the fourth circuit of Virginia, the federal statute reconstituted the 
fourth circuit as part of the fifth circuit court of Virginia.237 Justice Paterson 
wrote for the Court and examined whether the bond could be returned to the 
 
would conform with legal norms for trial motion procedures. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 117, 131–32 (1801) (“The 
words, ‘such court,’ on fair construction, refer to the court in which the motion has been made, and not 
to the term to which notice was given.”). And consider Talbot v. Seeman, where the Justice used “fair” 
as consistent and just to apply evenly to the same acts. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 33 (1801) (“There must then 
be incidents growing out of those acts of hostility specifically authorized, which a fair construction of the 
acts will authorize likewise.”). 
 233 See Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1614 (2012). 
 234 See discussion supra note 221. Justice Scalia would have rejected such reasoning. See, e.g., Scalia 
& Manning, supra note 233, at 1614 (“I’m not willing to let judges decide at large what is or is not absurd. 
There are pretty absurd statutes out there. That is what you get from legislative compromise.”). 
 235 Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 659−60 
(2013) (identifying eleven appropriate arguments in construction: text, structure, purpose, consequences, 
precedent, convention, custom, natural law, national ethos, political tradition, and honored authority). 
 236 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 237 Id. 
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fifth circuit court.238 He noted that this would be illegal if no text directly 
authorized the action.239 However, he interpreted the Constitution240 to allow 
Congress to authorize this kind of transfer, because the clause did not 
explicitly prohibit Congress from doing so.241 Justice Paterson rejected the 
additional objection that Supreme Court Justices must receive a specific 
commission to sit on that circuit court, because acquiescence to this practice 
for several years confirmed it was an allowable “construction.”242 
Judges have relied on historical acquiescence to practice in order to 
justify executive action as constitutional, and a case like Stuart indicates that 
the roots of such reliance stretch back to the early days of the Republic—
although the Justices relied on historical acquiescence to justify 
congressional action. Would that place long-standing congressional New 
Deal programs beyond constitutional challenge? Justice Paterson, for one, 
might think so. 
2. Deferring to Concerns About the National Interest 
Second, the Justices deferred to concerns about the national interest in 
ways that veer away from the typical linguistic or even substantive canons 
traditionally appropriate for resolving the meaning of legal text. The case of 
United States v. Schooner Peggy provides a useful example. Chief Justice 
Marshall wrote for the Court, determining that the case of the schooner 
Peggy fell within a provision of the treaty with France that provided 
restitution for “definite condemnation” and ships “definitively 
condemned.”243 Chief Justice Marshall rejected the argument that 
“definitive” referred to the final nature of the sentence of the circuit court 
below, finding that it was not definitive “in the sense in which that term [was] 
used in the treaty.”244 The court’s decree was final with relation to the court, 
“not in relation to the property itself.”245 Chief Justice Marshall found instead 
that the treaty referred to the actual condition of the property, otherwise those 
 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 308–09 (“[N]o other court could legally proceed upon the said bond . . . if there be no 
statutable provision to direct and authorize such proceeding.”). 
 240 Id. at 309 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2). 
 241 Id. (“In this last particular, there are no words in the constitution to prohibit or restrain the exercise 
of legislative power.”). 
 242 Id. (“[I]t is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several 
years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has 
indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical 
exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and 
ought not now to be disturbed.”). 
 243 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 108 (1801). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 109. 
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terms would be rendered surplus.246 He also noted that interpreting 
“definitive” otherwise would include situations where the ships were not 
actually condemned,247 which was not within the contemplation or design of 
the contracting parties.248 Finally, Chief Justice Marshall noted that while 
courts generally avoided retroactive constructions, where great national 
concerns of war were involved, the construction should account for the 
importance of those interests.249 
This kind of deference to important national interests allowed Chief 
Justice Marshall significant leeway in resolving the meaning of the word 
“definitive.” While this sort of deference may seem unsurprising given the 
vast expansion of executive power since the nineteenth century, Chief Justice 
Marshall was not considering a challenge to the constitutionality of executive 
power. He was interpreting one word to resolve the meaning of a treaty 
favorably for the United States and had significant leeway to do so. 
3. Using Legislative Evidence 
One of the most controversial tools in the construction zone may be the 
use of legislative evidence. In Ware v. Hylton, however, Justice Iredell not 
only considered legislative evidence, but found it quite compelling. Justice 
Iredell noted first that at the time the Virginia law was passed, a British 
creditor, as an enemy during wartime, could not sue to recover his debt 
anyway.250 He further noted that the Virginia law was necessary, given the 
depreciation of paper currency.251 Justice Iredell then looked to the treaty text 
and analyzed the separate phrases “[c]reditors,” “[n]o lawful impediment,” 
and “[t]o the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide 
debts heretofore contracted.”252 He considered legislative evidence, 
ultimately interpreting the words narrowly because a broad interpretation 
would interfere with property rights.253 
 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. at 110 (“It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will and ought to 
struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, 
but in great national concerns where individual rights, acquired by war, are sacrificed for national 
purposes, the contract, making the sacrifice, ought always to receive a construction conforming to its 
manifest import.”). 
 250 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 267–68 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.) (“Let us, however, 
recollect, that at this period no British creditor could institute a suit for the recovery of his debt, as the 
war constituted him an alien enemy, and therefore his remedy stood suspended at common law, so that 
he ran the risque of the entire loss of every debt, where his debtor proved insolvent during the war.”). 
 251 Id. at 270. 
 252 Id. at 278−80. 
 253 Id. at 279 (“This construction derives great weight from the recommendatory letter of Congress I 
before mentioned.”); id. at 280 (“When these general words, therefore, can comprehend so many cases, 
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Justice Iredell’s use of legislative history is an example of where 
Justices relied on legislative history to demonstrate legislative intent,254 
which Justice Scalia and other theorists would have rejected.255 Justice Scalia 
would only have allowed legislative history in a very limited way: for 
example, to show that a word was used in a certain way in a floor debate.256 
If legislative evidence was good enough for Justice Iredell (and Justice 
Paterson), might it be good enough for contemporary jurists? 
The Justices relied on a wide variety of linguistic and substantive 
canons in determining the meaning of various cases –– a wide variety of tools 
and evidence that contemporary jurists might similarly utilize. For original 
methods originalists and others who consider early American judicial 
practice a guide to how contemporary judges should approach getting from 
words to law, this evidence indicates that a wider variety of tools and 
evidence are appropriate for use, whether they consider judges to be acting 
in the construction zone or not. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note opened by asserting that evidence of early judicial practice 
has something to tell contemporary jurists about analyzing legal text: that at 
minimum, it holds descriptive value of early American historical practice, 
and at best, material for normative arguments about how contemporary 
judges should approach analyzing legal text. Insofar as original methods 
originalists and others believe that early judicial practice determines the 
methods available to contemporary jurists, such historical evidence may 
outline the approach and tools available to judges today. Even for those who 
believe Founding-era judicial practice should not guide, much less dictate, 
contemporary jurisprudence, a description of historical methods still 
provides material for articulating arguments about how judges should 
proceed today. It is only by describing and understanding historical practice 
that we can make arguments about its instructive value or inadequacy. With 
that historical evidence in hand, theorists and judges can more fulsomely 
engage in the debate about how we get from language to law. 
 
all reasonable objects of the article, I cannot think I am compelled as a Judge, and therefore I ought not 
to do so, to say that the general words of this article, shall extinguish private as well as public rights.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 254 See discussion supra notes 216−218. 
 255 See, e.g., Scalia & Manning, supra note 233, at 1612 (“Well, they owe that fidelity, first of all, 
because we are governed by what the legislators enacted, not by the purposes they had in mind. When 
what they enacted diverges from what they intended, it is the former that controls.”). 
 256 See, e.g., id. at 1616 (Scalia rejects the use of legislative history to look at legislative intent, 
although he “do[es]n’t mind using legislative history just to show that a word could mean a certain thing”). 
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So, what does the historical evidence show? First, that Justices engaged 
in interpretation and construction as a single process, alternating between 
textual and normative reasoning to determine the intent of the Framers or of 
Congress. In some cases, textual arguments seemed determinative; in others, 
normative reasoning was decisive. This finding illustrates some tension 
between the idea of limiting judicial discretion in construction and applying 
methods of interpretation and construction that would have been used in the 
Founding Era, at least to interpretation of the Constitution. Such tension may 
highlight important questions for some original methods originalists. 
Second, the Justices utilized a variety of tools and canons in the construction 
zone. To the extent that jurists believe historical methods should guide 
contemporary jurisprudential debates, acquiescing to historical practice, 
deferring to national interest concerns, and using legislative evidence are all 
fair game. 
To the extent that modern-day theorists or jurists find Founding-era 
evidence of judicial practice relevant to contemporary debates regarding the 
interpretation-construction, this Note offers evidence of how early American 
jurists did—and did not—go about determining the meaning of legal texts. 
While scholars and jurists will certainly continue to disagree about how we 
ought to get from language to law, this evidence adds to what we know about 
how our nation’s first highest jurists did so. 
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